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This thesis focuses on US actions in the Dominican
Republic in 1965 and in Grenada in 1983. Both of these
incidents involved US military action in minor Caribbean
island nations undergoing violent political revolutions.
Both incidents had significant East/West ramifications.
These two incidents are compared and contrasted for
policy similarities applicable to revolutionary regimes in
Latin America and the Caribbean basin.
The specific areas addressed are similarities and
differences in each situation regarding the motivations and
objectives of the US national leadership, international and
domestic repercussions of each action, and military
objectives and method of application in each case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The US used massive armed intervention during the 1965
Dominican Crisis and in 1983 in Grenada. Both of these rural
Caribbean islands were undergoing violent political revolu-
tions at the time US troops were introduced. Both of these
actions involved a significant East/West conflict as well
as danger to US citizens in the countries involved. The
actions were conducted for the stated purpose of protecting
US lives and to prevent a communist dominated regime from
coming to power.
Latin American nations have traditionally feared being
caught between US and European power struggles. The US is
overwhelmingly the most powerful country within the
hemisphere. Non-intervention in the affairs of a sovereign
state is a fundamental principle of the Organization of
American States. This paper will attempt to compare these
two actions as they relate to potential US actions in the
Western Hemisphere.
The comparison will address the motivations and objec-
tives of the national leadership. What were the inter-
national and domestic repercussions of acting or not acting
in these incidents? Are the similarities in the situations
that existed in these two countries comparable and useful
in predicting US policy toward Latin American revolutions?
Finally, what were the differences and similarities in the
military objectives and method of application in these two
events.
Neither of these events were planned as part of a long
term orderly scenario. The policies as executed were en-
acted on short notice as dynamic answers to immediate
problems.
The ideological identification of minor neighboring
states does not threaten the vital interest of a major
power. The development of a client state relationship with
a hostile superpower, however, definitely affects vital and
strategic interests. A US neighbor developing a client state
relationship with the Soviet Union is distinctly not in the
interest of the United States. We have consistently attempted
to block the development of such relationship by diplomatic
or military means.
There is in the Caribbean significant anti-American
sentiment that has nothing to do with the East/West conflict.
It remains from the early part of the century when the US
repeatedly intervened in the affairs of Latin America and
Caribbean nations. There is also a strategic US Soviet
battle for influence in the same region. Although this is
not a zero-sum game Soviet success at obtaining influence
and allies in the Caribbean basin is unquestionably
detrimental to US interests. It is detrimental to the
interests of US foreign policy, domestic policy, and
strategic position.
Advocates of an activist policy argue that, "losses" of
Caribbean countries in our own back yard weaken our alliances
globally. Allies may doubt US willingness to act when such
action may result in conflict. Bluffing only works when
your opponent has reason to believe the bluff. Strategically,
an increase in Soviet allies and military access in the
Caribbean further complicates the problem of dealing with
such a force should conflict occur. Soviet military access
to Caribbean bases improves their strategic position relative
to the US by reducing the logistical problems of supporting
deployments in close proximity to the US.
Shipping routes through the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico
carry about 45% of all US maritime trade as well as 55% of
imported oil to the US. Additionally, the majority of NATO's
resupply routes are from US ports on the Gulf of Mexico
through the Florida straits and the Caribbean.
A. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN
US interests in the Caribbean dates to the early days of
this republic. Jefferson and Washington in his farewell
address implored Americans to avoid entangling alliances
The Soviet/Cuban Connection In The Caribbean , Washington
D.C., Department of State and Department of Defense, 1985,
p. 3.
with European powers. These early leaders recognized the
advantage geography had given them in America's physical
separation from the major powers of their world. On
December 2, 1823, President James Monroe issued the Monroe
Doctrine in an attempt to prevent further European influence
in the Western Hemisphere and thereby potential conflict
between the fledgling American republic and powerful European
states. This proclamation stated:
We should consider any attempt on the... part of any
European power. . . to extend their system to any portion
of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.
We... view any interposition. . .by any European power...
as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward
the United States.
European powers intervened in Latin America throughout
the 19th century. At various times Germany, France, Britain,
Italy, and Spain intervened in Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay,
Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela, Haiti, Dominican Republic,
and Falklands Islands. US responses to these actions were
inconsistent partly due to the inability of the US to
effectively block them. When the French intervened in
Mexico in the 1860 's the US was involved in an issue with a
greater degree of survival interest, the War Between the
States. Additionally, occasional interventions were viewed
by some as not completely inconsistent with US interests.
The British occupation of the Falklands in 1833 had a
stabilizing influence on commerce.
2
C. Neal Ronning, Intervention in Latin America , New
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p. 1-7.
During the first century of the US existence as an
independent state, we were preoccupied with the domestic
aspects of populating and taming a continent. As US power
grew, America began to more vigorously protest European
actions in "our" hemisphere. European powers generally
refrained from taking US threats seriously, at least until
the British/Venezuelan crisis of 1899. The US compelled
3England to submit to arbitration. This incident provided
relief to Venezuela, who received valuable territory on the
Orinoco river through arbitration. The incident also sowed
seeds of anti-American sentiment within the hemisphere.
Secretary Olney stated with extraordinary insensitivity:
No European power should forcibly deprive an american
state of the right and power of self government and of
shaping for itself its own political fortunes or
destinies... Today the United States is practically
sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon
the subjects to which it confines its interposition.
^
The Spanish American War, Theodore Roosevelt, the Canal
diplomacy, and Alfred Thayer Mahan all impacted on a rising
American expansionist movement. Roosevelt and the canal
fueled the American expansionist movement. The war with
Spain provided new territory and Mahan ' s theories on sea
power provided the argument and the answer for growing
3Fredico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations ,
New York, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1971, p. 68.
4 Gil, p. 68.
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American power. In the aftermath of WW I, America emerged
as a bona fide world power. Europe had been decimated
physically by the war. America was untouched physically.
The Caribbean along with the rest of Latin America
feared they would be caught between traditional European
5colonial power struggles and an emerging US imperialism.
European intervention in Latin America resulted frequently
from unpaid debts. The problem as seen by Theodore Roosevelt
was:
A chronic wrong doing or impotence which results in a
general loosening of the ties of civilized society. .
.
(which) may ultimately require intervention by some
civilized nation.
As the self appointed policeman of the Western hemisphere,
in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, and to prevent
European intervention Roosevelt embarked on an era of
intervention which reduced five Latin American countries
to the status of protectorates: Cuba (1902), Panama (1903),
Dominican Republic (1905) , Nicaragua (1909) and Haiti (1915)
.
In the post World War II world, the Soviet Union replaced
traditional European powers as the potential threat to
the United States. The traditional European world powers no
longer carried the colonial clout of the nineteenth century.
The US, preoccupied with assisting the nations of western
Ronning, p. 6.
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Europe rebuild their war-torn economies and opposing Soviet
expansion, largely neglected the less developed countries
of the western hemisphere. In the post war world, Soviet
occupation troops enabled Stalin to expand Soviet influence
to Eastern Europe.
This neglect of the Western Hemisphere was demonstrated
by their not being included in any regional economic
assistance. Latin American economies suffered in WW II as
well as those in Europe yet the US economic rebuilding plans
were restricted to Europe and Japan.
In 1950, the US committed ground troops to counter
"communist aggression" in Korea. In this case, Soviets'
imprudently allowed and the US deftly utilized diplomacy
in obtaining United Nations backing to legitimize its action
in the face of "communist aggression." Shortly after Korea,
an intragovernmental memo, NSC-68, elucidated our government's
concept of the difference between the US and Soviet strategic
doctrine.
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid
down in the Preamble to the Constitution. .. to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote
the general welfare, and secure. .. liberty . In essence...
to assure the integrity and vitality of our free
society. .. founded upon the dignity and worth of the
individual. The fundamental design of the Soviet Union
is to retain and solidify. . . absolute power, first in
Earl T. Glauert and Lester D. Langley, The United
States and Latin America , Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1971,
p. 127.
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Soviet Union and second in the areas they control...
achievement of this design requires the dynamic exten-
sion of their authority and the ultimate elimination
of any effective opposition to their authority."^
The Truman Doctrine committed the US to contain Com-
munism anywhere on the globe that it manifested itself.
Communism and Soviet control were synonymous during the two
decades following World War II.
In 1959, Fidel Castro forced Batista from power in Cuba.
Batista had ruled a heavily corrupt government and twice
took control in a military coup. Castro's victory was
hailed in the United States as a victory for democracy. By
I960, Castro announced there would be no elections and began
establishing closer ties with the Soviet Union. Fidel
Castro's view of himself was one of regional power broker, a
goal he could best pursue with Soviet financing.
Americans were surprised and shocked by Castro's
announced Marxism-Leninism in Dec 1961. The Nationalist
hero, who had driven Batista out of Cuba to restore consti-
tutionalist government, had in less than two years become
a communist dictator and Soviet ally 90 miles from Miami.
Soviet miscalculation, American unwillingness to
adequately identify its interest, and Cuban machismo combined
in October 1962 to bring the world to the brink of nuclear
war. The Soviets were unwilling to go to war over missiles
7
"NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council,"
Naval War College Review, p. 54.
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in Cuba, and we were not willing to go to war over Soviets
in the Caribbean. War was averted. The US became determined
to avoid another confrontation before it reached such dire
circumstances.
Johnson like many elected politicians did not believe
the American people were capable of recognizing the realities
of the situation. The US electorate would not have tolerated
a president "allowing a second Cuba to emerge." Johnson's
lack of faith in the electorate's sophistication caused him
to "embellish" the threat with characteristic Texas flair.
The result was a loss of credibility that grew worse in Viet
gNam and nearly tore the nation apart.
Radical or revolutionary governments have not been
universally opposed by American administrations. The US
accepted revolutionary governments in Bolivia and Mexico to
prevent their association with Germany. In 1961, the US
increased aid to Bolivia to prevent its developing closer
ties with the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's offer of
economic assistance.
Also in 1961, the US backed the abortive Bay of Pigs
invasion of Cuba. This action received partial backing
from the Kennedy administration. The US was not prepared
to expend the resources necessary to remove Castro. The
Q
James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy
Making and the American Political System , Boston, Little,
Brown and Co., 1983, p. 13.
14
one phenomenon more costly than a military excursion is
one that fails. This half-hearted, ill-planned excursion




On Wednesday April 28, 1965, 500 US Marines landed on
the shores of the Dominican Republic for the immediate stated
purpose of evacuating US citizens. This action drew harsh
criticism from US press, academics, and Latin American
leaders who argued that the action was a violation of the Rio
Treaty. This action accomplished all of its immediate and
underlying goals yet remains one of the most criticized
events of contemporary US policy.
Critics of Johnson's actions in the Dominican Republic
such as Senator J. William Fullbright, Jerome Slater, and
Abraham Lowenthal did so because they believed he was thwart-
ing democracy, in fact driving non-communist leftist rebels
to the communist camp. The critics view was that the
revolution in the Dominican Republic was not communist
controlled but leftist oriented. The administration view
was that the movement was or would become communist, (Soviet/
Cuban) controlled. Both of these view points were arrived
at by a presentation of the facts, an objectivist view.
Both were predicated on prior assumptions of the interna-
tional system. What was for Johnson a major interest,
involving preservation of the free world, was for his
critics merely a peripheral interest. The notion of the
US as primarily responsible for maintaining world order
was not the isolated view of a right wing politician:
16
The present national security policy system came about
in response to a world view that emphasized the neces-
sity of American participation and leadership in a global
struggle aga-inst an implacable communist foe.
9
Diplomacy involves negotiation and compromise not
confrontation but this view of American national security
was biased toward action.
The argument made by Senator Fullbright to the congress
that the administration made an early assessment that the
coup was or would be exploited by communist is accurate.
The administration and State Department were still suffering
from the attacks by Senator Joe McCarthy. "McCarthy's
ghost sat in numerous offices in "foggy bottom."
Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe, Soviet detonation of
a nuclear device and communist victory in China combined to
polarize US sentiment into an anti-communist fervor. This
issue was unscrupulously exploited to the detriment of US
interests by the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joe McCarthy,
The state department in 1965 had not yet recovered from
its decimation at the hands of McCarthy. He had initiated
a "red scare" during the early 1950 's which led to such
un-American activities as the "House Committee on Unamerican
Activities" and "black balling" resulting in ruined careers
9Nathan and Oliver, p. 36.
J. William Fullbright, Intervention in Latin America ,
Neal Ronning, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p. 56.
Nathan and Oliver, p. 38.
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and loss of prestige among State Department employees and
career diplomats. McCarthy stated in a speech in February
1950: -
The reason why we find ourselves in a position of im-
potence in international af fairs. .. is. . .because. .
.
the state department is thoroughly infested with
communists. Foreign Service officers who had made
predictions that Mao would overcome Chiang in China
were blamed for the "fall." The presence of com-
munists in the Dominican Republic was expected. There
were communist present. Whether or not they would have
mustered sufficient power to control the revolution
remains in doubt. **
John Paton Davis a diplomat victimized by McCarthy
observed:
Bold new ideas and quick decisions were asked of men...
whose experiences for a decade had been that bold ideas
and actions were personally dangerous and could lead to
congressional investigations and public disgrace...
purged from the right under Dulles... the left under
Kennedy. . . How can you expect these men to do a good
job. 13
In the Dominican Republic there was no communist regime
in power. Instead there was an attempted coup, rebels some
of whom were communists, but many were constitutionalist.
There was also anarchy. The US fear was that the Soviet and
Cuban backed communist factions would successfully exploit
the rebellion and gain control of the government.
This assumption was certainly not a foregone conclusion
but not a completely unreasonable scenario. In Cuba only
12Nathan and Oliver, p. 32.
13Nathan and Oliver, p. 45.
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six years earlier Castro had faced far greater odds when
he toppled Batista.
American ambassador to Cuba Earl Smith, who had con-
demned the Castroite movement and Batista's anti-Castroite
measures "was instructed to express impartial neutrality."
Herbert Mathews of the New York Times interviewed and
photographed the guerrilla leader in the Sierra Maestra.
Smith as a private citizen agreed that "Castro came to
power partially by the failure of the state department to
act decisively." Mathew's interview gave prestige, guerrilla
14terrorism was given little coverage.
The Johnson administration weighed the odds and prob-
abilities and concluded that he feared the possibility of
a communist takeover greater than the criticism he would
certainly take for intervening. Neither the policy makers
nor the American public would have tolerated a "second
Cuba" in the Caribbean. President Johnson said at a White
House meeting on April 30, 1965:
We have resisted communism all over the world: Viet Nam,
Lebanon, Greece. What have we done on our own
doorstep. ... If I intervene, I can't live in this ,^
hemisphere. If I don't I can't live in this country.
Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy Of The United
States , New York, 1968, p. 172.
15Meeting Notes, 4/30-5/15/65, Office Files of Jack
Valenti, Box 13, LBJ Library, p. 12.
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The Dominican Republic crisis occurred at a time when
the US had committed itself to military support of the South
Viet Namese government against a communist North Viet Nam.
Subjectively with the US committing troops in a far corner
of the globe to "contain communism," coupled with the fresh
memory of the Cuban missile crisis, the Johnson administra-
tion could easily be predicted to support any Caribbean
government against a communist revolution. The questions
then became: Is it a communist revolution?
Saturday, April 24, 1965, Donald Reid Cabral acting
President of the governing Triumverate and Secretary of the
Armed Forces was ousted by a military coup in the Dominican
Republic. On Wednesday April 2 8th the United States Marines
landed on Dominican soil with the immediate objective of
protecting American lives. Within two weeks there were
22,000 American troops in the Dominican Republic with four
expanded objectives: 1. Protect American and foreign
lives. 2. Halt violence through cease fire and a peace
keeping presence to separate the warring factions. 3. Pre-
vent communist factions from seizing power. 4. Provide
the option and atmosphere necessary for the Dominican people
to hold free elections.
US foreign policy in the 1960 's was an attempt to move
Latin and Caribbean countries toward democracy. After
Trujillo's assassination a naval task force maintained
station in the Caribbean to block the Trujillo family's
20
attempts to regain control of the government. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk warned on November 18 , 1961:
The US would not remain idle if the Trujillo's tried
to reassert dictatorial domination.
President Kennedy also prepared a contingency plan to use
armed intervention to prevent a "Castro like" takeover. He
recognized and opposed the oppressive Trujillo regime yet
feared a Cuban/Soviet ally more.
We have three choices: establishment of a decent
democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo
regime, or a Castro-like regime. We ought to aim
for the first but we really can't renounce the second
until we are sure we can avoid the third. -^
Under Trujillo nearly 2 million people were living in
sub-human conditions. Many lived little or no better than
the Haitians, the poorest of the hemisphere, 50% lived on
17less than one hectacre of land.
In early 1960 Trujillo had attempted to assassinate
Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt, an outspoken anti-
Trujillo leader. The Organization of American States (OAS)
responded by imposing sanctions, breaking diplomatic rela-
tions, and instituted a petroleum and arms embargo. The
United States citing OAS sanctions as authority reduced
16Abraham Lowenthal , The Dominican Intervention ,
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 11.
17 ....Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis , Lawrence
Lipson trans, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978, p. 65.
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sugar purchases ($22,000,000). This action hit the heart
18
of Trujillo's financial base and personal wealth.
In the aftermath of Trujillo's assassination in 1961
through US initiated OAS pressure, Joaquin Balaguer emerged
as the most moderate and least corrupt of the Trujillo
government. Balaguer appeared suitable as a vehicle for
the democratization of the Republic. US activism in this
instance was demonstrated by President Kennedy's remarks
regarding Balaguer:
The anti-communist liberals aren't strong enough. We
must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road
to democracy. 19
Balaguer was replaced by a seven man Council of State which
would govern as a transitional body until elections could
be held in December 1962.
The three major parties had arisen quickly following
Trujillo's death. The Dominican Revolutionary Party headed
by Bosch, the National Civic Union (UCN) , dedicated to the
struggle for democracy against Trujillo, the 14th of June
Political Group (1J4) . The 1J4 was an anti-Truj illo,
Castro-like party "ready to sacrifice political democracy
20for social justice." Rarely does a one party system







The US government contributed to the Dominican democratic
process through public and private means acting as a go
between among-political factions. In mid January General
Wessin y Wessin attempted a military coup. The US threatened
to cease the newly approved financial aid and reimpose strict
21
sugar quotas if the Council of State was not reinstalled.
The threat of US economic sanctions and potential military
action was sufficient to avert the coup.
The election resulted in victory for Juan Bosch, orator,
writer, and intellectual leader of the Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD) . Bosch was an anti-Truj illo leftist, who promised
social reforms.
The Dominican Republic had little experience in democratic
government. Many of those left over from the Trujillo regime
remained in power particularly in the military. These individ-
uals were not disposed to be dispossessed of their privileged
position. They resisted President Bosch's changes.
During Bosch's eight month tenure as President he proved
to be more adept as an orator than as an administrator. His
administration faced massive problems in dealing with the
post Trujillo Dominican Republic. He wasn't skilled enough
to succeed. The Dominican economy slumped further amid
Bosch's ineffectual political leadership. Bosch was not
21Lowenthal, p. 12
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politically astute. A vain and arrogant man he expected
22followers rather than sought political friends.
The US sought to promote the democratic process in the
Dominican Republic granting aid. The US increased sugar
quotas to help stimulate a failing Dominican economy.
Ambassador John Bartlow Martin was very active in supporting
(advising) the administrations of Dominican President Juan
Bosch.
Martin was so extensively involved in the day to day
affairs of the Bosch government. He stated that: "Bonnely
23
and the other councilmen seemed to feel I was one of them.
"
Bosch was a strong nationalist who no doubt resented all this
unsolicited and paternalistic advice. Bosch had been deeply
affected at the age of 7 when he saw the Dominican flag
lowered and replaced by the US flag. He sought cordial
relations with the US but not a close association.
Support became a decision in which Ambassador Martin
defined Bosch in terms of pro-American or anti-American.
The possibility of a pro-Dominican position separate from
American interests apparently did not occur to the Ambassador
Juan Bosch as characterized by Ambassador John Bartlow
24
Martin was a good orator and poet but a bad administrator.
His brief administration according to Ambassador Martin
22Gleijeses, p. 285.
23Gleijeses, p. 96.
Transcript of Oral History of John Bartlow Martin,
.BJ Library.
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...may well have been the most honest in Dominican
history. . .
.
He slashed sairaries of his ministries in half and his own
almost 4 0% from $2000 to $1000 p/month and his own from
$24 00 to $15 00. He waged a war on corruption in government
in a country with corruption so deep that it became his
downfall.
Threats to military leaders and ministers who rotated
the lucrative jobs among themselves were not Bosch's only
problem. He threataned their privileged position. He lost
the backing of the church in a Roman Catholic country due to
his position on the legality of marriage, cohabitation and
the legal legitimacy of children born out of wedlock. His
position was socially progressive, practical, and too radical
25for a conservative clergy. A powerful institution in a
country 95% Catholic. Unemployment increased and the
economy continued to fail.
In land reform the overlapping agencies and complex
litigations resulted in only 40 families settled by July
1963. His popularity among the disillusioned masses
dropped. 26
Ambassador Martin requested an aircraft carrier be sent




27September 1963. President Kennedy, who had been prepared
to use military force to prevent a communist takeover was
unwilling to send a carrier in support of Bosch. On the
assumption that Dominicans could best solve Dominican
problems, the US attempted to remain on the sidelines.
The US objective was to see democracy flourish in the
Caribbean. US policy operated on the assumption that
although a Soviet or Castro type of totalitarian regime can
be imposed on a country, democracy cannot be imposed but
must be allowed to develop. The US sought to walk a delicate
balance between the tolerance needed for the growth of
democracy without allowing communist cancer to gain a strangle
hold on the young state.
The nature of the regime in the Dominican Republic was
not vital provided it wasn't Soviet affiliated. Kennedy's
refusal to send the aircraft carrier was predicated on the
fact that the US would not intervene except to prevent a
communist take over of the government. In 1965 "communist"
equated to Soviet.
The coup that overthrew Bosch in September of 1963 did
so for several reasons, not the least of which was jealousy
and hunger for power. However, he had lost virtually all
of his support, public, politicans, clergy, and the military.
27Lowenthal, p. 13.
26
The existence of communist in his government, or the
charge that Bosch was soft on communism while never proved
was venemously repeated by political opponents of Bosch
2 8
and by the clergy. The military fearing the growth of a
communist threat, in which they would be executed as Batista's
Generals were in Cuba, acted.
The coup led by General Wessin y Wessin formed a Junta
and agreed to hold elections by September 1965. The decision
to recognize the Junta was made by Kennedy in late November.
The actual recognition was delayed three weeks due to
Kennedy's assassination. The administration didn't want to
give a false impression of a shift in policy due to the new
29president. The junta became the Donald Reid Cabral
government. This government never developed a base of
support. It was considered to be remnants of the old
oligarchy and was an almost immediate target of the extreme
left. The US diplomatic and intelligence corps, however,
believed that by 1965 Reid was doing a good job and a majority
31
of people opposed Bosch's return.
2 8Gleijeses, p. 97.
29Martin History, p. 20.
CIA memo, 7 May 1965, National Security Files, National
Security Council History, Dominican Crisis, Box 7, LBJ
Library, p. 4.
31Transcript of Oral History of Thomas Mann, LBJ Library,
p. 17-24.
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The Dominican Republic had held one election in thirty
years, electing a government that lasted 8 months. The
senior military officers were Trujillo's proteges, their
immediate subordinates identified with the opposition.
General Wessin y Wessin had attempted a coup of the council
of state thwarted by Kennedy. Bosch and Balaguer had com-
mon problems chief among them: the opposition of the
Generals facing lost privilege and potential wealth, and a
floundering economy.
US at first withheld recognition of the Post-Bosch Junta
pressing for more PRD members in the government and free
political activity for all non-communists. The administra-
tion never had a well defined policy toward the Dominican
Republic. Martin had become disillusioned with Bosch. The
US believing he had lost his countrymens 1 support refused
to intervene on his behalf.
Reid Cabral was hard on communists and on the military.
He deported members of the radical left and right. Addi-
tionally, he followed Bosch's reforms in closing the smug-
gling operations of corrupt military officers. Reid Cabral '
s
reforms were too radical for some of the more senior officers
and not broad enough for the junior officers. His regime
also was beset by continuing economic difficulties and, by
the spring of 1965, rumors that he would not allow free
elections to be held in September as scheduled. This rumor
although unsubstantiated fueled unrest among those already
impatient with his administration.
28
The economic crisis was exacerbated by low sugar prices
and unusually severe drought. The economy dropped to its
lowest point in forty years. Reid Cabral attempted to
implement an austerity program to restore the country's
balance of payments, approved by the IMF. The populations
looked to the national palace for relief but the government
32itself was in great financial difficulty.
At the time of the coup Ambassador W. Tapley Bennet was
out of town having been recalled to Washington for consulta-
tion regarding the worsening conditions in Dominican
Republic. He had departed Santo Domingo Friday after consult-
ing with Reid. Both men were aware of rumors of an upcoming
coup, but Reid agreed that he didn't anticipate any trouble
in the immediate future. CIA estimates placed the probable
33date of the coup at no earlier than June 1st.
The coup that began on April 24 progressed in three phases
The first phase lasted from April 24 to April 27. It began
on the morning of April 24 when General Morros A. Rivera
Cuesta, the Army Chief of Staff, advised Reid Cabral that
several influential army officers were definitely involved
in a pro-Bosch conspiracy. Rivera Cuesta then confronted
34





The coup was, therefore, carried out prior to its planned
date and caught much of the anti-Reid Cabral factions
unprepared. This phase was predominately a group dedicated
to returning Bosch to power without elections. June 1, was
the date scheduled for campaigns to begin for the September
elections.
The pro-Bosch group was a loose association of military
officers with little in common; some acted out of a belief
that the military must cleanse its honor for its actions in
toppling the Bosch government. Many were frustrated by the
political in-fighting following the end of Trujillo's
regime. Some were jealous of the profits of the senior
officers and officials or disgusted by their flagrant
35
corruption. Many who were not involved with the rebellion
quickly joined "to settle old scores" with Wessin y Wessin.
The military represented the only coherent force in the
Dominican Republic. The rebels fearing that the military
high command would take swift action to suppress the
rebellion began passing out weapons to civilians on the
first day of the rebellion. Colonel Francisco Caamano







opened. This action allowed extremist groups to obtain
weapons and resulted in anarchy.
Throughout the weekend the situation in Santo Domingo
was chaotic and confused. Government troops under Wessin y
Wessin's command were slow to react. Radio announcements
contradicted one another throughout the day and left doubt
as to who was in control. Jose Francisco Rene Gomez announced
General Rivera Cuesta's arrest on Radio Commercial, followed
immediately by a denial of the coup by Radio State Santo
Domingo. However, shortly after this announcement Radio
38Santo Domingo proclaimed a 6 p.m. curfew. PRD leaders
took over a Radio Santo Domingo studio and announced that:
...young and honest officers dedicated to constitution-
ality had overthrown Reid.
Charge' Connett reported Saturday night that the insur-
rections appeared to be limited to the 2 7 of Feb. camp and
restricted to some officers and NCO's. The Chief of Staff
of the Air Force, General Cespedes, and Navy Commadore
Rivera Caminero were backing Reid and Wessin y Wessin was
expected to join them. The embassy was not certain what the
39
rebels intended but their success seemed remote.
37
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Elements of the army continued to join the rebels while
Wessin y Wessin refused to respond; 2/3 's of the army units
in the vicinity of Santo Domingo were in revolt. Reid
delivered an ultimatum to the rebels occupying the two rebel
camps to surrender by 5 a.m. Sunday morning.
By Sunday, the air force chief of staff refused to act
against the rebels and Wessin y Wessin claimed he could not
operate his tanks without air cover. General Imbert offered
Reid his assistance in exchange for a cabinet position and
then to the rebels when Reid informed him the appointment was
impossible. Imbert later became head of a junta. His forces
aggressively attacked the rebels with air strikes and artil-
lery in populated areas of the city. There were civilian
casualties.
Reid desperate for support asked for US troops claiming
"Communists activisits were at work." American officials
believed that there were only a handful of officers committed
to Bosch's return and that the rebellion was at least as much
anti-Reid Cabral as pro-Bosch. The rebellion appeared to be
confined to the military. Therefore, the embassy considered
a junta guaranteeing elections a practical and agreeable
solution.
The crowds were incited to violence, the national police,
who had attempted to remain politically neutral and maintain
order were singled out and attacked until most abandoned
their distinguishing uniforms. An armed band sacked and
32
burned the anti-communist, some say fascist newspaper Prensa
Libre. The owner Rafael Bonnilla Aybar took refuge in the
Guatemalan embassy. Street crowds looted houses and stores
and murdered. At 10:30 Sunday morning, Reid decided to
resign and notified the American embassy. Shortly after
4011:00, Colonel Caamano arrested Reid Cabral
.
The military high command, who had refused to defend
Reid Cabral, now refused to allow Bosch's return and were
willing to fight to prevent it. The anti-Bosch military
chiefs notified the rebels that they would attack unless
Molina Urena, designated by Bosch to accept the presidency
in his absence, stepped aside in favor of a junta. They
41
offered to guarantee elections in return.
The service chiefs requested US support but none was
given. The rebels did not respond and all three services
moved against them. Colonel Caamano took refuge in the El
Salvadoran embassy believing that air attacks were ineffec-
tive and the rebels responded by calling for mobs to sack
the homes of Air Force officers. They gave addresses and
paraded captured Air Force wives on television.
Embtel 1045, 1965 April 25, National Security Files,
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The embassy sought to remain neutral, Ambassador Bennett
ordered the aircraft carrier, USS Boxer, within sight of land
with her aircraft struck below as a demonstration of US
neutrality. The prominent role aircraft carriers had played
in Dominican affairs supporting or demonstrating US resolve
was significant, unfortunately, the subtlety of the maneuver
was apparently lost due to the misunderstanding of the Boxer's
42purpose.
By Monday, Santo Domingo was in chaos, as a result of
the early rebel policy of passing out weapons so freely.
The streets were filled with armed civilians not under control
of the rebel or loyalist leaders. Under these conditions the
communist factions who had received training and had a well
organized, although small, group attempted to assume
leadership.
There appeared to be an opportunity to form a junta that
would guarantee free elections in September. Rebel leaders
refused to endorse a junta that included Wessin y Wessin.
General Wessin insisted that he or his confederate must be
part of the junta or his troops would attack. Neither side
would compromise nor trust his opponent. The embassy pressed
for the junta but their efforts were hampered by poor com-




On Tuesday the last opportunity to influence the
revolution short of armed intervention was missed. Molina
Urena requested Ambassador Bennett's assistance in mediat-
ing talks. Ambassador Bennett instead lectured rebel leaders
for initiating the carnage by their free lance distribution
of weapons. He pointed out that rebel forces had taken
advantage of every cease fire to improve their position there-
by jeopardizing the process. Loyalist forces had the rebels
on the run at this time and Ambassador Bennett had reason to
believe that General Wessin y Wessin and General Guerro
would soon defeat the revolt. These two Generals did not
trust each other. Both demonstrated extraordinary caution
due to poor communications and distrust of the others
intentions.
Many of the pro-Bosch rebels fled the revolt at this
time. However, when loyalist forces failed to press their
advantage Caamano and a dedicated cadre returned. These
men had been insulted and the lack of cooperation among
loyalist forces made them more determined than ever.
The embassy telegrams continued to be confusing, emphasiz-
ing both "worsening conditions" yet clinging to belief that
"loyalist forces would prevail." Much of the confusions
resulted from the lack of communications within the city and
the near state of anarchy that prevailed. On Wednesday the
27, US citizens, mostly tourists, gathered at the Embajador
Hotel for evacuation. "300 rebels surrounded the hotel
35
and terrorized the evacuees waving tommy-guns and shooting
43
up the lobby."
This incident coupled with the police's inability to
even protect themselves demonstrated their inability to
protect innocent bystanders despite the fact that no one
was injured.
At 3:20 p.m. Wednesday, President Johnson's staff meet-
ing was interrupted by a request for 1200 marines to restore
order from Ambassador Bennett. This request was refused,
two hours later at 5:16, Washington received a request for
marines to safeguard American lives. The marines were to
re-inforce embassy guards and provide security at the evacua-
tion site after military and police stated they could no
longer provide security. President Johnson still in the
White House Staff meeting briefly discussed the request and
44granted it.
The US faced no easy choices in the Dominican Republic.
Reid Cabral lost the support of the population and the
military. The US could not be expected to militarily support
a regime with no domestic backing. Bosch was regarded as
ineffectual, additionally, he too had lost much of his
popularity and it was the US assessment that his return
would not be welcomed by a majority of Dominicans. The
43
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Dominican military high command appeared more interested in
personal gains than national issues. In the election held
in December 19"66, Balaguer won with a 56% majority.
The US attempted to appear neutral. In the beginning
the embassy staff believed that the loyalist forces would
put down the rebellion. As the rebellion progressed into
the second phase many of the original rebels gave up but a
smaller and more dedicated force remained. US forces dis-
tributed food and medicine to unarmed men, women, and children
45
of both sides. Their fear of communist infiltration of
the rebel movement produced a natural alignment with the
loyalist. The US did not fully support the loyalist
position. As a result US soldiers and policy was unpopular
to both sides, the Dominicans shouted "yankee go home."
The OAS held a regular meeting on April 28, at which
the US requested discussion of the Dominican situation.
No specific action was recommended nor taken. The US did
not anticipate a need for direct action at that time. Later
that evening the US requested a special session. This
session took place the next morning at 10:30 but the Council
took no action. The Council instead recessed for forty-
eight hours to seek instructions from their governments.
Briefing on Situation in Dominican Republic, Wednesday,
July 14, 1965, National Security Files, National Security
Council History, Dominican Crisis 1965, Box 7, LBJ Library,
p. 74-121.
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The United States notified and consulted major Latin
American embassies regarding US action, after the fact. The
OAS was not consulted prior to implementing troop decisions.
The decision to land marines was made to answer an immediate
problem. The action was supported by many diplomatic
missions in Santo Domingo. On April 29 the Mexican, Peruvian,
Guatemalan, and Ecuadorian Ambassadors asked for US security
46forces to protect their embassies. Eventually the security
force encompassed embassy row at their request and many
availed themselves of the opportunity to evacuate nonessential
members of their diplomatic staff and families.
The Johnson administration realizing that continued
unilateral intervention would result in severe Latin American
criticism attempted to dispel the criticism by employing an
OAS collective action. The concept termed Betancourt-Figures
plan, an OAS military command under the command of a non-US
officer. This command would be pro forma, as the US would
be the principal supplier and would actually control the
force.
On May 6, the OAS voted to establish an Inter-American
Peace Force largely through the able efforts of US Ambassador
to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker. The initiative was passed
after three days of intense work by the exact number of
46 Dominican Action 1965 Intervention or Cooperation?,
The Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., Georgetown
University, July 1966, p. 29.
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required votes, including that of James Antonia Bonilla
Atiles, representative to the OAS from the then defunct Reid
Cabral government.
The Inter-American Peace Force was created from elements
of six countries: Brazil, 1,152; Honduras, 250; Paraguay,
178; Nicaragua, 159; Costa Rica, 21; and El Salvador, 3.
The entire force was under the command of Brazilian General
Hugo Alvim. US General Bruce Palmer was second in command.
General Palmer in keeping with US policy of ultimate control
stated that in the event of a policy conflict he would have
to follow the instructions of his government.
The countries of the OAS adopted the initiative primarily
because they could accept a semblance of collectivity better
than unilateral US action. The US had made it plain by
deed and word that we were going to act.
The Dominican crisis was a situation in which the US
unconvinced of the need for allies acted in a manner to
ensure control. The actions were conducted in a hesitating
manner with never any clean cut long term objective other
than protect US lives and prevent another Cuba. US troops
entered the Dominican Republic in phases, albeit quick
phases, much as we did in Viet Nam. The first contingent
entered to provide security for evacuees and embassy
personnel. The second contingent arrived to reinforce
security troops. The loyalist meanwhile stopped fighting.
Rather, they waited for the US troops to clean out the
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communists. The rebels considered US forces as aggressors
and opened sniper attacks.
The US got involved in a civil war in two stages:
initially to protect US and Foreign lives; secondly, because
we believed the revolt was communist controlled. Dominicans
were obviously suffering. Dead bodies lined the street.
There was wide spread killing and decaying bodies in the
street. The Dominican Red Cross estimated that 2,500 people
were killed between April 25, and April 29, most by wild
firing and mob action.
The US diplomatic corps was too timid to refute claims
of communist influence. Former Ambassador Martin stated
that he believed the CIA reports had exaggerated communist
activity during his tenure. He did not refute the report
because he couldn't be sure of its accuracy. It was safer
48
to assume the worst. Furthermore asking these men to
take such a stand in the aftermath of McCarthy may have
been asking too much. President Eisenhower, the congress,
and the news media share the failure for not exposing
McCarthy's diatribes for the rhetorical hogwash they were.
The Johnson administration's actions in this instance
were not the result of a carefully studied policy. Rather
they were the manifestation of a stumble along policy, a
47 . . .
Domimcan Action 1965, Intervention or Cooperation ,
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series of decisions to answer immediate problems. The close
personal control that President Johnson insisted upon
reduced his role to that of an action officer handling the
nosiest problem in his "in basket." There was sufficient
reason to believe US citizens were in danger in Santo
Domingo. Given Johnson's view that communists in the
Caribbean represented a vital interest, the chance to reflect
on the long term nature of his actions would have probably-
had no effect.
Despite the tremendous problems and questionable
legality of this operation, it resulted in democratic elec-
tions in 1966. The triumph of the operation was in 1978.
For the first time in the history of the Republic a head of
state, President Balaguer, transferred power peacefully to




On October 25, 1983, a combined force of US Marines
and Rangers, followed by 750 paratroopers of the 82nd Air-
borne and an Eastern Caribbean multi-national force of 300
49
men, stormed ashore on the island of Grenada. This action
termed a "Rescue operation" by President Reagan was conducted
in response to a request from Grenada's Governor General Sir
Paul Scoon.
The operation was conducted primarily to prevent 1,0 00
US citizens mostly medical students on the island from becom-
ing hostages. Grenadian spokesmen had insisted they were in
no danger. The underlying reasons for the actions were: To
restore the opportunity for democracy from chaos and remove
the Soviet threat generated by the New Jewel Movement from
power.
The mission code named operation "Urgent Fury" accomplished
all of its goals. The operation was an overwhelming military
success and diplomatic failure. It resulted in international
condemnation: "The US was the sole negative vote on a United
Nations resolution deploring the action." European allies
vocally denounced the act and British Prime Minister Margaret
49
The Eastern Caribbean Force was comprised of troops
from six Caribbean Island nations: Antigua, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, Dominica, Jamaica, and Barbados.
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Thatcher complained that the US had invaded commonwealth
territory against their advice and without prior consultation.
Despite the international reaction, domestically a majority
. . 51
of US citizens approved of the operation.
The Reagan administration expected to take heavy criticism,
but as one of the members of the organization of Eastern
Caribbean Force stated:
American intervention might be distasteful but the US
had to do something about Grenada^
2
This dilemma is that of a modern nuclear superpower
struggling to contend with the complex problems of competing
interest in an anarchial international forum. It was dom-
estically popular because it was quick and successful. It
came at a time when the US had been injured by evil in the
world and frustrated by our inability to counter it. The US
public saw the action in terms of good versus evil in which
US actions may not have been legal but were just.
The US view of the Soviet Union softened with the adoption
of detente, but the Afganistan invasion and in September, 1983,
50Kenneth Auchincloss, John Walcott, and Howard Fineman,
"Americans at War," Newsweek , November 7, 1983, p. 62-64.
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KAL 007 sobered US judgement of the Soviets. In September
1983 the Soviet Union deliberately shot down an unarmed
civilian airliner (Korean Air Lines Flight 007) that had
strayed into Soviet air space, killing 269.
President Reagan swept into office in 1980 on a wave of
increased awareness of defense needs in the wake of the
"Iranian hostage crises." Fifty-two US citizens, members of
the US government, were held hostage for 444 agonizing days.
Diplomatic efforts finally returned these US citizens, but
the process was excruciatingly long and was accomplished only
after a man perceived as much more militant took office,
Ronald Reagan. The Carter administration completed the
negotiations but the hostages were actually released imme-
diately after Reagan's swearing in, a final Iranian insult
to Jimmy Carter.
President Reagan feared US medical students would be
taken hostage and frustrated by KAL 007 incident, he received
the plea for help within twenty-hours of the news that a
suicide bomber had taken the lives of 239 marines in Beirut.
These men part of a multilateral peace keeping force were
located in a susceptable area for political reasons. This
incident probably added incentive to act where no additional
incentive was needed.
Grenada is a small tropical island in the eastern
Caribbean. It was a member of the British Commonwealth,
receiving full right of internal government in 1967 and
44
independence Feb. 7 , 1974. It has a rural population pre-
dominately made up of descendants of slaves and indentured
servants. The country has a tradition of plantation auto-
53
cracy and strict racial consciousness. Its culture has
made Grenada susceptible to the charismatic leadership style
54
of Sir Eric Gairy and Maurice Bishop.
Gairy, a union organizer and right wing strongman, was a
populist radical of the 1950' s. His leadership inspired
strikes and demonstrations in 1951 that resulted in British
55intervention to restore order in St. Georges.
Gairy subsequently won six elections and became Prime
Minister in 1967. Gairy maintained control through violence
and political intimidation enforced by his private army, the
"Mongoose Gang." However, as his behavior became more bizarre
and unemployment rose to 40% a new charismatic, well-educated
leader came on the scene in the person of Maurice Bishop.
The New Jewel Movement was founded by the joining of two
radical parties, the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education,
and Liberation and the movement for the Assemblies of People.
The new party adopted a socialist platform, organized strikes,
53Anthony P. Maingot, The United States in the Caribbean ,
Tad Szulc, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1971, p. 53-66.
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and demonstrations, and advocated violent revolution. These
incidents were ruthlessly suppressed by Gairy's Secret Police.
Maurice Bishop was severely beaten and in 1974 his father,
5 8Rupert Bishop, was killed in a demonstration.
March 13, 1979, while Gairy was attending the spring
session of the United Nations, to speak on UFO's, a small,
well-organized party of NJM seized control of the army
headquarters and the only radio station on the island. Gairy
denied there had been a coup, but the NJM was in power and
would remain so until October 1983.
The NJM was marked by political competition and ambition
from the beginning. Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard won
two of the three seats awarded to the NJM in the elections
of 1976. Bishop was the popular charismatic leader and Coard
the intellectual party technocrat. Coard attempted to push
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the party more radically toward Leninism in 1977. The
NJM later declared their failure to adopt:
Leninist approach to part building strategy and tactics...
as the major failing of this stage of the revolution. "^
The NJM was a Leninist party when it seized power. It
proceeded to develop close ties with the Soviet Union, Cuba,
57The Grenada Papers , Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall,
San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984.





Eastern Block Countries, and Korea. in his "Line of March"
speech, Bishop describes the heavy handed control of his
regime to build socialism in rural Grenada. Bishop stated
the party must develop "a serious Marxist Leninst van guard
party.
"
The NJM attempted to learn from fraternal Communist
parties often invoking Lenin or citing historical examples
that had been used by an earlier Communist Party. The final
such example was the "Afghan" solution referred to regarding
the events leading up to the Oct. 12 coup removing Bishop as
Prime Minister.
Bishop stated that following the March '79 Revolution
fourteen members of the "petty-bourgeoisie," "national bour-
geoisie," and capitalists sectors were named to comprise
the people's revolutionary government for the express purpose
of calming the fears of "imperialism" (read US and British)
to prevent intervention. This speech, given by Bishop to a
general meeting of the party, September 13, 1982, outlines
NJM's approach to their relationship with the petty and national
bourgeoisie mentioned earlier, justice in Grenada under NJM,
and freedom of the press:
It is important to note comrades that while we are in
alliance with sectors of the bourgeoisie. .. they are not
part of our dictatorship. They are not part of our rule




See Series of documents on, cooperation and arm transfers
contained in The Grenada Papers, and Grenada Documents: An
Overview and Selection.
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...When they want to put out a newspaper and we don't
want that, we close it down... if the truth is told they
have been suppressed by the dictatorship.
There were 183 detainees documented by the Bishop government
as political prisoners.
Undated reports, discovered with government documents,
were used to monitor the activities of "internal elements."
The undated and unsigned reports identified: "enemy forces;"
"our forces;" "objectives;" contacts;" and "population." These
reports were specifically used to monitor Grenadian dissidents
and the American students.
Grenada cannot be discussed apart from Soviet influence.
The NJM employed a one party rule dictatorship using detention
and torture to maintain control. This in itself would not
endanger US interests or Grenada's neighbors. Grenada's
Ambassador to Moscow, W. Richard Jacobs, in a letter to
Foreign Minister Unison Whiteraan and Deputy Prime Minister
Bernard Coard outlines what the Soviet Union expected of
their Grenadian allies:
...We have to be seen at least as influencing. . .at least
in the English speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of
revolutionary activity. At the same time, we have to




"Belmont Surveillance Report" and "Plan of GI, (General
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develop normal state to state relations with our
neighbors.... To the extent that we can take credit
for bringing any other country into the progressive
fold our pre-stige will be greatly enhanced... a candi-
date is Surinam. . .and Belize. 64
In October 1980, Grenada signed its first arms agreement
with the Soviet Union. The first shipment included 12
mortars, 24 anti-tank grenade launches, 54 machine guns,
communication equipment, and spare parts. Additionally, they
had already received 1000 automatic rifles from Cuba and
2000 uniforms from Nicaragua. Later shipments added eight
armored personnel carriers, two armored reconnaissance and
patrol vehicles, 1000 submachine guns and other assorted
equipment. Virtually, all of the arms equipment was shipped
via Cuba and unloaded under cover of darkness. Additional
agreements were discovered among captured documents called
for delivery of weapons between 1980-85. There included 50
armored personnel carriers, 60 mortars, 60 heavy guns, 50
portable rocket launches, 50 light anti-tank grenade launches,
2000 submarine guns, 2 patrol gunboats, 12,000 rounds of
ammunition, small arms and various other equipment.
64Embassy of Grenada in the USSR letter from W. Richard
Jacobs to Unison Whiteman and Bernard Coard of July 11, 1983,
Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, Dept. of State




The NJM Party assured its dominance over all the organs
of government by placing party members as supervisors. This
guaranteed party primacy in government organizations. As
a result the 2000 man, Peoples Revolutionary Armed Forces
(PRAF) continued to follow the instructions of the NJM
fi 7Central Committee after Bishop had been over thrown.
Economic conditions improved somewhat, unemployment
decreased from 40-33% but the economy remained in dire
straits and by the summer of 1983 many disillusioned party
members began to resign. In the Soviet traditions of "self-
criticism," the Coard faction blamed the central committee
itself, which under the leadership of Bishop was guilty of
a "cult of personality" and "right opportunism."
Coard argued that the party had regressed ideologically
as evidenced by their failure to whole heartedly support
the Soviet line on Afghanistan and KAL 007. Continuing
economic difficulties still plagued the country, negative
cash flow threatened additional investments in key
. , . . 68industries.
Coard pointed out his own resignation six months earlier
to eliminate stress on the party. He concluded that per-
sonality conflicts prevented him from accomplishing the
fi 7
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programs to implement "full Leninization of the party."
The Central Committee invited Coard to join Bishop in joint
69-
Leadership.
This criticism took place in September of 1983. On
September 25, 1983, Bishop agreed to joint leadership. He
would be out of the country from September 27 to October 8.
He realized he did not have the means to resist. However,
following his return he did not appear willing to share
power with Coard. Bishop was accused of spreading rumors
in the street to discredit Coard.
The Polit Bureau meeting of October 12, identified
Bishop's "threat" to call on the workers for help as a
"Gairy attitude." Their logic, therefore, concluded that
he was building a "personality cult;" this, then, was
evidence of "right opportunism." Therefore, he wasn't a
70
communist and couldn't lead the party. October 14, Coard
and General Hudson Austin formally ousted Bishop placing
him and Jacquelin Craft, his mistress, Education Minister,
and mother of his son, under house arrest.
Ian Lambert, a Coard backer in rather neat rationaliza-
tion stated that: The country could have only one Prime
Minister, since Bernard Coard is a communist, Coard should
be the prime minister. If anyone was killed it would be
69The Grenada Papers , p. 259-270
70The Grenada Papers, p. 316-322
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Bishop's responsibility for spreading the rumor that Coard's
faction planned to shoot him. Eight days later when mass
demonstrations freed Bishop, fifty people were killed and
71Bishop was executed. The Coard faction attempted to keep
the shake up secret. Unison Whiteman, Foreign Minister,
72
and three other pro-Bishop ministers resigned on the 18.
Whiteman led a crowd of several thousand demonstrators, who
ignored shots fired by the guards and freed Bishop and Craft.
The crowd with Bishop proceeded to market square and then
73to Fort Rupert.
The fort offered arms as well as access to radio and
telephones. The charismatic Bishop had not lost his populist
support as evidenced by the size of the demonstrators
(estimated to be 10,000, 10% of the population). The people
according to Grenadian journalists Alister Hughes, "had
74gone Bishop, not socialist." Coard feared a popular
uprising.
According to "Bulletin from Main Political Department"
of 10/20/83, a post coup document produced by the party, the
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headquarters. Bishop then allegedly proceeded to beat and
whip the soldiers who refused to support him. Then according
to this document, arms were passed out to the crowd who
opened fire on the soldiers. In the fight Bishop and several
75
of his supporters were killed.
Another account of the incidents of "Bloody Monday"
7 fi
reported the army opened fire first, attacking the fort
with armored personnel carriers. Bishop too weak to lead a
defense surrendered and along with an undetermined number of
supporters was shot despite his plea for mercy.
Coard played a central role in deposing Bishop, however,
he managed to stay out of the limelight so well that the
Western press speculated he had also been executed in
Austin's bid for power. In fact, it appears that Austin
acted as Coard' s spokesman. Coard thus used Austin's popular-
ity to attempt to blunt the public reaction to Bishop's
77death. General Hudson Austin announced a 24 hour shoot
7 8
to kill curfew. There was a great deal of speculation
regarding who was in charge: Austin? Cornwall? Coard?
On Oct 21, a Navy task force on the way to Lebanon was




Whitaker and others, p. 43.
77Valenta, p. 20.
78Whitaker and others, p. 41.
53
There just happened to be a Marine Amphibious Ready Group
about to deploy to Lebanon. This serendipitous situation
enabled the operation to be conducted with complete opera-
tional security.
In Grenada, the party called for "national unity to turn
back foreign aggression." In a statement reminiscent of
Bishop's use of the "beourgeoisie" as outlined in the "Line
79
of March Speech," Major Christian Strode announced several
80
moves in an attempt to prevent US action. Strode stated:
Grenada wanted to establish better relations with the
US than Grenada has had in the past... in two weeks the
military would hand over power to a committee represent-
ing all sectors of Grenadian society. .. and that Grenada
would pursue a non-aligned policy.
Strode also promised to allow two US Consular officials
the opportunity to visit Grenada and meet with US citizens.
Donald Cruz, US Consular officer from Barbados, visited
Grenada Friday, Oct 21. He met with Major Leon Cornwall
head of the Revolutionary Council as well as with the medi-
cal students. The students told him they were afraid. Cruz
then experienced some tense moments when the plane returning
8
1
to pick him up was not allowed to land.
Governor General Sir Paul Scoon smuggled a message to
Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados. The message transmitted
79The Grenada Papers .
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in his capacity as Governor General in the absence of an
identifiable government, in accordance with British common
law, reported chaos and asked for help. The Eastern
8 2Caribbean Nations requested help from Washington. US
Consular Officer Cruz' cable following his visit to Grenada
reinforced the administration's conviction to act.
The People of Grenada welcomed US forces as liberators.
Grenadian reactions were characterized by Michael Sarenouche
who shouted: "I love it! I love it I I love it, Uncle
8 3Sam!" every time he heard US gunfire. US students were in
danger or at least they felt they were. The students kissed
the ground upon their return to US soil.
It is too early to determine if Grenada will develop
the ability to continue a government responsive to its
citizens. Grenada held elections in December 1984, elect-
ing Herbert Blaize. The last US troops prepared to leave
among shouts of "America must stay."
82Frank and Walcott, p. 75.
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IV. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
These two incidents, the 1965 Dominican crisis and the
1983 Grenadian action, share many common features yet each
must be viewed in its own unique context. In both instances,
actions were taken to protect US citizens endangered by mass
violence and the absence of a stable government with the
capability to protect them. In both cases, a primary
American objective was to halt or prevent the spread of
communism in the hemisphere. In both instances, US citizens
inadvertently found themselves under fire by elements that
could not be readily identified nor controlled by a recogniz-
able government.
Both Presidents Johnson and Reagan saw US relations
consistent with the view expressed in NSC-68. In both
instances, they realized that their actions were not in
keeping with international law or a policy of non-intervention
They believed that they were fighting Soviet aggression in
an indirect manner. In Grenada, there was unquestionably
Soviet influence and a desire to export the revolution.
They both realized that they were making an internationally
unpopular decision. The decisions were made to avoid a
worse domestic problem, as well as to counter Soviet
aggression.
In the Dominican Republic, the Johnson administration
made an early determination that the coup of April 1965
56
which began as a move to re-establish the constitutionally
elected government of Juan Bosch was either supported by or
would be overwhelmed by Cuban/Soviet backed communist elements
in the rebel movement. The allegation was never conclusively
proved. Additionally, Johnson's fear that the US electorate
did not possess the sophistication and mental acuity neces-
sary to recognize the threat led him to exaggerate the
dangers to US citizens. Johnson's exaggerations cost him
credibility and public support. There was no need for such
exaggeration. The situation that existed was bad enough.
Grenada was clearly an East/West confrontation. This
incident could not have been accomplished by a peacekeeping
force. A peacekeeping force can't fight its way ashore. It
can only function when there is some hope of cooperating
factions. Grenada's diplomatic problems stem from the
apparent notion of the Reagan administration that interna-
tional organizations are useless.
Diplomacy and international organizations were used
after the fact in the case of the Dominican Republic and
virtually ignored with respect to Grenada. Neither, however,
was employed to the extent possible. In the case of the
Dominican Republic, a meeting of the OAS was called and
Ambassadors of influential Latin American countries were
briefed after the decisions were made. The policies
carried out were accomplished "on the run" in the ad hoc
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manner of the Kennedy and Johnson administration. The White
84House staff acted as a surrogate state department.
President Reagan acted without prior consultation with
British Prime Minister Thatcher, who had a strong historical
interest in Grenada. This failure to consult with Britain,
at least as soon as we were discussing the operation with
the Eastern Caribbean States, suggest that Reagan remains
unconvinced of the need for allies. This lack of diplomacy
coupled with the quick application of military power at a
time of increased tension in Europe over nuclear weapons
strained the US/European alliance. Additionally this dis-
regard for allies sensibilities will not serve US interest
in the Western Hemisphere.
From the standpoint of international law the US did
have sufficient justification to take action to protect US
citizens. US action encompassed much more than this narrow
objective. The actions undertaken were accomplished to
benefit the people of the countries involved. They were not
legal but the national leadership considered them just.
The legality of US action will be overshadowed domestic-
ally by the success of the operation and by the captured
documents. US students "kissing American soil" buried the
issue for the mass public. Americans will accept a lapse
of legality if they believe the cause is just. Traditionally
84Nathan and Oliver, p. 44.
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Americans have gotten as much law and order as we thought
A A 85we needed.
The use of international organizations is of particular
interest. In the case of the Dominican Republic, every one
of the objectives could have been met through an international
peacekeeping force. President Johnson could have authorized
a marine escort for the initial evacuation of US citizens.
Coordinated with this move made a joint UN/OAS plea to
establish an international peacekeeping force under the
command of Brazil or some other regional or UN nation. We
could have focused on the humanitarian need to effect a
cease fire and act as mediators in negotiating a conflict.
However, to have done this he could not have considered the
conflict of vital US interest. A superpower placing a vital
interest in the hands of a multi-lateral organization is not
feasible.
By down playing communist influence early in the struggle,
we may have prevented the crisis from becoming an East/West
issue. The opportunity was there in the early days to have
used third party measures with US support. This would have
prevented the action from being unilateral as well as getting
Latin support. Once the crisis became identified as East/
West, the majority of third world nations quickly lost
interest in cooperating with the US.
85Dennis W. Brogan, The American Character , Second
edition, New York, Vintage Books, 1956, p. 60.
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The situation in Grenada did not lend itself to estab-
lishing a peace keeping force. Additionally, immediately
following our tragedy in Beirut this option probably would
not have been feasible.
Grenada and the Dominican Republic are tropical island
countries with agrarian economies. The Dominican Republic
is a one commodity economy based on sugar. Sugar accounts
for 48% of its exports. The United States is its major
trading partner with 83% of exports going to the US and
50% of its imports coming from the US. The country occupies
the eastern 2/3 of the island of Hispanola and covers
18,704 square miles. Its population of just over 4 million
is 60% rural.
Grenada is a tiny island 21 miles long and 12 miles
wide. Grenada's economy is based on agriculture and tourism,
The principal crops are bananas, cocoa, and nutmeg. Unlike
the Dominican Republic, Grenada's cultivated land was pri-
marily in the hands of small farmers. Less than 1% of farm
holdings are greater than 100 acres, and 87% of farms were
five acres or less. Grenada's major trading partner, as of
1975 before the NJM developed a Soviet client relationship,
has been Britain. The UK accounted for 70% of all exports
and 35% of its imports.
1970 figures.
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The United States has since the time of Theodore Roosevelt
been closely involved with Dominican affairs. The country
was originally settled by Spanish explorers in the late
15th century then abandoned for the more lucrative shores
of Mexico and Peru. Colonial control remained in the hands
of Spain except for a brief period, 1795-1809, when control
of the island of Hispanola passed to France. The Dominican
Republic declared its independence in 1821 but was occupied
by Haiti until 1844. Grenada has a tradition of English
colonialism and plantation rule. Grenada received its
independence in 1974. The close association between the
US government and the Dominican Republic through aid, trade,
and prior military occupation naturally influenced US action.
In the Grenada action, the sitting government did not
have good relations with the US. Maurice Bishop had taken
8 7
over the island with a 40 man force in 1979. He had
proclaimed himself a Marxist Leninist and developed close
ties with the Soviet Union and various radical regimes, such
as Fidel Castro in Cuba and Moammar Khadafi of Libya.
The US had never been a major influence on the island.
The most significant US presence was the large number of
US students enrolled in the medical school at St. Georges.
The British were the traditional major influence in Grenada.
87Valenta, p. 4.
61
The Dominican crisis was a civil war that began as a
constitutionalist movement and remained confined to the
city of Santo Domingo. The US feared that one side was or
would be dominated by Soviet/Cuban communists. Grenada on
the other hand was a coup among the oligarchy. There were
US citizens in danger in both incidents: Rebels with
machine guns fired their weapons indiscriminately at the
Embajador Hotel evacuation site in Santo Domingo. In
Grenada, US medical students were under close surveillance
amid a 24 hour shoot to kill curfew announced by General
Austin.
The Dominican Republic was in a state of anarchy in the
city of Santo Domingo. The revolt never spread into the
country side but remained confined to the city and immediate
outskirts. There were dead bodies decaying in the streets.
Innocent people were being killed as armed groups roamed the
streets looting. Whether or not the revolution would have
succeeded or would have benefited the Dominican people
cannot be determined.
The citizens of Grenada were oppressed by one party
rule as discussed in Chapter III. Captured documents in
Grenada indicates that had the coup there been completed
and the new regime allowed to consolidate power their fate
would not have improved and may have worsened. The course
outlined was for continued one party dictatorship, suppres-
sion of dissent, and more radical Leninization of the party.
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The mass public had supported a popular charismatic leader
and his killers feared a public uprising. US students were
effectively hostages unable to leave due to the curfew
imposed by General Austin.
Grenadian officials attempted to placate the US in this
regard by allowing US consular visits with government spokes-
men and with the students. The consular officer's impres-
sions along with Governor General Scoon's plea for help
confirmed Reagan's assessment that action was required.
The Dominican Republic represented anarchy and civil
war. The population within the city of Santo Domingo were
sufficiently divided to provide support for guerrilla
operations under attack. To have advanced on the rebel
forces would have required an intensive house to house
operation that would have extracted high cost in lives as
well as funds. Such an operation may have resulted in the
destruction of the democratic process as Slater and
Lowenthal among others feared.
Grenada represented an armed oligarchy without popular
support. The military was given a clear objective, the
operation was conducted by a specially designated task
force comprised of units already scheduled to deploy. The
task force operated under the command of Vice Admiral Joseph
Metcals. The Reagan administration style of leadership was
such that once the decision to utilize a military force to
execute the policy, there was little extraneous flow of
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information outside the chain of command. Admiral Metcalf,
by feeding constantly his most up-to-date information and
intelligence to his superiors along with his intentions,
prevented the chaos of conflicting instructions. A military
problem of providing distant commanders with real time
information is that it results in a constant temptation to
input commands from a multi-headed command structure. A
military operation must have one commander responsible for
the operation.
The other most significant difference from a military
perspective is the size of the country. Grenada measures
133 square miles. It has an airport at either end of the
island, situated north/south. It has suitable beaches for
landing force operations. Its physical location is such
that its major supporters Cuba nor the Soviet Union could
marshall sufficient force to counter the US task force.
As mentioned earlier, its population had ceased to support
the "government."
US troops arrived unopposed as a security force in the
Dominican Republic. US action stopped short of full support
for either side in the Dominican crisis and was heavily
criticized by spokesmen for both sides. Although heavily
opposed by Cuban and Grenadian soldiers, US troops in the
Grenada landing were welcomed by the public as liberators.
US unilateral action was taken partly because of
Johnson's sense of urgency, his need to personally control
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everything within his power. For example, in the case of
ex-ambassador and special envoy John Bartlow Martin, the
decision was made to send Martin to the Dominican Republic
as an extra observer to aid Ambassador Bennett. The
decision was made at a presidential meeting and Martin was
8 8dispatched immediately to catch a plane. President Johnson
was too close to the problem to effect long term planning
yet too distant to effectively control the operation.
The amount and level of command that exercised control
of military forces was a significant difference. The
Dominican Republic never had a clear military objective
other than to maintain a presence and protect lives. This
was a military presence for political purposes. The opera-
tion was run completely by the White House. A command center
was set up manned twenty-four hours a day with direct access
to the president and White House staff.
In contrast, President Reagan played the part of the
decisive president who assigned a military objective to a
military commander then allowed his commander to execute the
orders without interference. Grenada offered a clear
military objective: Rescue US citizens from two locations
on the island and take the island from a possibly confused
dictatorship that would be defended with assistance from
Cuban troops.
Oral History of John Bartlow Martin
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The information flow made possible by modern technology
and Johnson's penchant for personal control resulted in
constant communication yet much inaccurate and confusing
intelligence information. The poor intelligence partially
caused by the intense involvement of the White House in
embassy affairs, and contradictory statements by administra-
tion officials, partially resulting from incomplete informa-
tion with a rapidly changing scenario, combined to frustrate
the press, who subsequently lost faith in the administration's
view of the crisis.
The press then sought out rebel opinions among a diverse
group of anti-Reid Cabral rebels. Some were constitution-
alists, some were communist, many were opportunists seeking
personal gain. US media reporters contacted rebel leaders,
who eagerly espoused their constitutionalists views. The
rebels weren't held to the same scrutiny as the administration
These views contrasted with the darker interpretation
of the Johnson administration regarding more radical members
of the revolt. This conflict and time lag applying Johnson's
statement concerning incident of one phase of the operation
to a later phase reinforced the media's distrust of the
administration's view and exacerbated the flow of informa-
tion problem. The embassy reported "unconfirmed reports of
beheadings"which Johnson embellished to justify his actions.
These reports were inaccurate and resulted in embarrassment
for the administration.
66
Reagan, on the other hand, because he had turned the
operation over to the military was able to say he had no
information other than what everyone else had. This is
effect transferred much of the media's criticism from the
administration to Admiral Metcalf.
In both cases, the president made a tough decision and
chose the course he believed to be just. These two men
shared a distrust of the Soviet Union that has been justi-
fied by documents captured in Grenada.
The final similarity is that in both cases US efforts
were directed toward promoting free elections and with-
drawing US troops as rapidly as possible. Free elections
were held and US troops withdrawn after 18 months.
A. CONCLUSION
Militarily the Grenadian and Dominican actions were
quite different. The swift success of "Operation Urgent
Fury" proved that the US could plan and execute an amphib-
ious landing under fire, on short notice, on a 12 mile by
21 mile island, whose population did not support the
defending armed forces. These are significant qualifiers.
The incidents resulted in venomous denunciation by
Nicaraguans, who have been paranoid regarding a potential
US intervention in Nicaragua. A Nicaraguan invasion would
be exponentially more difficult for many reasons not the
least of which is US troops would be fighting a nation not
an armed oligarchy.
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We must understand the limitations of military power.
There is not a military solution that can solve the prob-
lems of Latin America. Although in Grenada, the process
could not have begun without a military presence. We
have demonstrated an ability to win the war. Now we must
win the peace. It is a task much more difficult. One
problem with military intervention is that by doing so the
intervening country shoulders responsibility for the prob-
lems of the host country.
The Dominican Republic's major problems were economic
disparity and opportunistic corruption in its political
forum. Dominicans needed a political spokesman who would
be a good loser. There wasn't one. The political problem
was eased during the post intervention transition govern-
ment when the OAS commission and US pressure forced radicals
of both sides out of the Dominican Republic. Both Wessin y
Wessin and Caamano were forced out of the country.
Dominicans do have the political machinery in place
to give the citizenry a voice in government. A democracy
after all isn't necessarily fair, Nazi Germany was a democ-
ratically elected government. Democracy does provide the
public an opportunity to choose a regime that will be
responsive to their needs. Dominicans must do the rest.
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The US is now preparing to withdraw the last troops
89from Grenada. Grenadians want a continued US presence.
The US, however, is not prepared for an extended military
presence in Grenada. We have accomplished our quick fix.
Grenada still has an unemployment problem and many fear
that former soldiers will recover hidden weapons and prey
on the population once the remaining Americans leave. The
US has provided $57 million in aid spread out over two
years. Hopefully, this will enable Prime Minister Herbert
Blaize's New National Party to invigorate Grenada's economy,
President Johnson saw communist influence in the
Dominican Republic out of proportion to their numbers.
President Reagan seems to view communism as synonymous with
Soviet. His critics claim that he is overly predisposed to
blame a litany of Latin American problems on "communist
insurgents." However, just because Reagan is paranoid
about Soviet involvement in Latin American problems doesn't
mean they aren't there. The sources of instability in the
90
Caribbean are not always contained in the country.
President Reagan has an objectivist view of foreign
policy. His assumptions are that we are in a fundamental
89
"Grenadians Want Yanks to Stay," Monterey (Calif.)
Peninsula Herald , May 12, 1985, p. 9A.
Jiri Valenta, "The USSR and the Caribbean Basin,"
Rift and Revolution in Central America, American Enterprise
Institute, 1984, p. 287.
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conflict with the Soviet Union and it is a zero sum game.
We must be willing to protect our national interests in a
way that will minimize miscalculation. We must also keep
in mind that there remains in Latin America significant
anti-American sentiment devoid of East/West considerations.
We must recognize the difference between a leftist national
movement and a Soviet client relationship. This will require
more attention to Latin America and the Caribbean affairs.
In the words of Vernon Walters: "The Caribbean isn't our
91backyard it's our frontyard."
The Soviet Union appeared to believe the US had lost
its will to employ military power in the aftermath of Viet
Nam. The Grenada invasion may cause them to re-evaluate
92
that idea. The action has limited application. The US
must not view Grenada as a completed operation. We must
develop a long term coherent plan designed to address
specific economic and social problems of the regions.
91Vernon Walters, Soviet/Cuban Strategy In The Third
World After Grenada, A Conference Report, Jiri Valenta and
Herbert J. Ellison Chairmen, Kennan Institute, Woodrow
Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 51.
92Valenta, USSR in the Caribbean, p. 299.
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APPENDIX A
PERSONS WHO PLAYED LEADING ROLES IN THE DOMINICAN CRISIS
Joaquin Balaguer President of the Dominican Republic
when Trujillo was assassinated and living in exile in New
York when the 1965 revolution began. He became the leading
candidate of Dominican moderates for president and on June 1,
1966 was elected over Bosch and Bonnelly.
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. Ambassador to the
Dominican Republic from March 9, 1964 until April 1966. He
made the basic recommendations that led to U.S. action.
Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit Chief of a three-officer
military junta at the San Isidro base who formally notified
Bennett his forces could not be responsible for the safety
of Americans in Santo Domingo.
Rafael Bonnelly Rightist political leader former Pres-
ident of the Dominican Republic. A candidate for President
in the election of June 1, 1966.
Rafael Bonilla Aybar Owner of the newspaper Prensa
Libre. He was hunted by rebel mobs and took refuge in the
Guatemalan Embassy. A rumor that he was to be evacuated
with American civilians led the mob to descend on the
Embajador Hotel.
Juan Bosch Elected President of the Dominican Republic
in December 1962 and overthrown the following September.
Bosch was in exile in Puerto Rico when the revolution of
1965 was mounted in his name. He returned in September 1965,
to campaign for president as head of the PRD.
McGeorge Bundy Presidential advisor and chief of a
mission sent to Santo Domingo by President Johnson in
May, 1965.
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker United States Ambassador to
the OAS.
Col. Francisco Caamano Deno Dominican rebel military
officer, took refuge in the Embassy of El Salvador and
emerged to become President of the "Constitutionalist
government" in the Ciudad Nueva, a rebel controlled section
of Santo Domingo, until the Provisional Government came into
being on September 3, 1965.
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William B. Connett Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.
Embassy in Santo Domingo, who was in charge there in
Bennett's absence when the violence began.
Antonio Guzman Member of Bosch's PRD party proposed to
head the Provisional Government. Guzman eventually became
vice presidential candidate on the Bosch ticket. He was
elected president in 1978.
Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras Commissioned a general
after taking part in the assassination of Trujillo, Imbert
emerged as head of the Government of National Reconstruc-
tion junta until the Provisional Government took control.
John Bartlow Martin Former Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic who was sent back by President Johnson after the
revolution to assist Bennett.
Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann President
Johnson's principal advisor on Latin American affairs.
Jose Rafael Molina Urena A Bosch supporter, President
of the Chamber of Deputies, who assumed the Provisional
Presidency of the first short-lived rebel government. He
took asylum in a foreign embassy when the rebel cause
appeared lost on April 27.
Gen. Salvador Montas Guerrero Commander of Dominican
troops of the San Cristobal garrison who marched from the
west against the rebels when the armed forces decided to
resist Bosch's return.
Secretary-General Jose A. Mora A Uruguayan who heads
the OAS secretariat, he arrived in the Dominican Republic
on May 1 in the role of peace-maker between the two warring
factions
.
Lt. General Bruce Palmer, Jr. U.S. airborne officer
who commanded American contingents and served as Deputy
Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force.
Gen. Hugo Panasco Alvim A Brazilian officer who com-
manded the IAPF.
Donald Reid Cabral Dominant member of the Triumvirate,
overthrown by the April 24 revolution.
Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero Chief of the
Dominican Navy at the time of the revolution, who took arms
against the rebels.
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Gen. Marcos Antonio Rivera Cuesta Armed forces chief of
staff under the Triumvirate overthrown by the April 24
revolution.
Gen. Jesus de los Santos Cespedes Chief of the Dominican
Air Force which was the first military arm to attack the
rebels.
Capt. Mario Pena Tavares Aide-de-camp to Gen. Rivera
Cuesta who assisted in the arrest of his commander at the
outset of the revolt on April 24.
Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin Commander of the armed forces
training center at San Isidro. Wessin attempted to storm
the rebel area in the Ciudad Nueva but lost heart and with-
drew to his base. He was forced into retirement and exile.
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APPENDIX B
PERSONS" WHO PLAYED LEADING ROLES IN GRENADIAN
REVOLUTION, 1983
Hudson Austin A key figure in the 1979 leftist revolu-
tion, Austin was a commander of Grenada's army and militia,
which overthrew Bishop, and head of the 16-member council
installed after the coup.
Fitzroy Bain A union leader, Fitzroy Bain was killed
with Bishop following the Coard takeover in October 1983.
Norris Bain Minister of Housing, Norris Bain was killed
by the Coard forces in October 1983.
Maurice Bishop Prime Minister and early leader of the
New Jewel Movement. Bishop was elected to Parliament in
1976. Bishop was killed in the aftermath of the coup
engineered by Coard in 1983.
Bernard Coard Deputy Prime Minister in the Bishop
government, and Minister of Finance, Trade, Industry, and
Planning. He was founder of the Organization for Revolution-
ary Education and Liberation, which merged into the New Jewel
Movement, but which was later reportedly started anew as the
Organization for Educational Advancement and Research.
Phyllis Coard Brenard Coard 's wife, and head of Radio
Free Grenada and the National Women's Organization.
Leon Cornwell Grenada's army chief and ambassador to
Cuba under Bishop, Cornwall was also a leading Coard backer.
Jacqueline Creft Minister of Education, youth, and
social affairs in Bishop's cabinet, Creft also lived with
Bishop, with whom she had a son named Vladimir, age 4. She
was killed during the Coard takeover.
Donald Cruz U.S. Consular Officer to Barbados, who went
to Grenada at the New Jewel Movement's invitation in Oct.
1983.
Sir Eric M. Gairy Founded the Grenada Labor Party in
1950, became prime minister after independence from Britain
in 1974. Gairy, a former nightclub owner and spiritualist,
was in New York to speak at the United Nations about UFOs
when he was overthrown in absentia in a coup led by Maurice
Bishop.
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George Louison Minister of Agriculture under Bishop,
Louison strongly defended Bishop during the Coard coup, but
was not killed.
Admiral Joseph Metcalf Commander of Naval Task Force
for "Operation Urgent Fury" in Grenada, 1983.
Unison Whiteman A co-founder of Grenada's New Jewel
Movement and foreign minister under Bishop, Whiteman was
in his late 30s when he was killed by the Coard faction.
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